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Recent Decisions
Contracts - Anticipatory Breach Where One Party Has
Fully Performed. Phelps v. Herro,215 Md. 223, 137 A. 2d 159
(1957). In 1955 plaintiff contracted to sell to defendant certain interests in stock and realty for $37,500, defendant to
pay $5,000 presently and issue to plaintiff a promissory note
calling for payment of the balance in installments beginning in January, 1957. The $5,000 was paid and plaintiff
transferred the interests to defendant. In 1956 defendant
refused to execute the aforesaid promissory note and also
notified plaintiff that he would not pay plaintiff the balance
of the purchase price. Plaintiff thereupon filed suit in
December, 1956 (before the next payment was due), to
recover the $32,500. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted on the theory that defendant's repudiation amounted to a total breach entitling plaintiff to sue
immediately for the entire sum due under the contract.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, (4-1), without
prejudice. The leading case on anticipatory breach of contract, Hochster v. De la Tour, 118 Eng. Rep. 922, 2 El. and
Bl. 678 (1853), permitted immediate recovery to plaintiff
on a contract of employment where defendant repudiated
before the time fixed for performance. The weight of
authority in this country has refused to apply the doctrine
of anticipatory breach to unilateral contracts, or bilateral
contracts that have become unilateral by full performance
on one side, where the remaining act is solely the payment
of money. (Citations in opinion.) This is the extent of the
court's ruling, even though some jurisdictions refuse to
apply the doctrine to any unilateral contract. The court
noted that the rule is different where defendant's obligation is something other than or in addition to the payment
of money; thus the contrary result in Development Co. v.
Bearing Co., 183 Md. 399, 37 A. 2d 905 (1944). There plaintiff recovered the full contract price, even though not yet
due, for defendant had failed to execute a chattel mortgage.
In the instant case, defendant was to execute only a
non-negotiable promissory note without additional security.
Standing alone, this does not alter the character of defendant's obligation solely to pay money. Hammond, J., dissented on two principal grounds (233). First, the law
pronounced in the majority opinion is at best an arbitrary
exception to the general doctrine of anticipatory breach
and is not based on any substantial reasoning. In support
of this view, he cites such authorities as Corbin, Judge
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Learned Hand, and Justice Cardozo. Second, even if the
exception be conceded, it should not be applied in the instant case. The majority opinion acknowledges the applicability of the doctrine where the agreement requires the
execution of a note with security, and numerous cases have
sustained the doctrine where there has been a failure to
give a negotiable note. No apparent reason exists why a
different rule should pertain to a non-negotiable note. The
provision for the execution of the note in the agreement
in question was undoubtedly a material part of the contract, and the measure of damages for the breach should
be either the amount of the note, properly discounted, or
the value of the goods sold. Judge Hammond concluded
that the majority opinion determined by mechanical formula what should have been decided only after consideration of the contract reason for the execution of the note
and the wilfulness of the breach.
Judge Hammond also called attention to 1 RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS

(1932)

Sec. 317, which states the rule that

present partialbreach plus a repudiation of the remainder
of the contract amounts to a total breach; and to Sagamore
Corporationv. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 A. 464 (1935),
applying the Sec. 317 rule to a contract which had become
unilaterial by full performance on one side. Judge Hammond would adopt this Connecticut ruling in Maryland.
Contracts - Memorandum Sufficient To Satisfy Statute
Of Frauds. Preis v. Eversharp,Inc., 154 F. Supp. 98 (E. D.
N. Y. 1957). Plaintiff brought this action to recover certain sums alleged due him pursuant to a contract with
defendant corporation. The only evidence of the agreement
was the duly recorded minutes of the meeting of defendant's board of directors. The minutes stated that the board
unanimously agreed to pay plaintiff stipulated amounts over
a twenty-four month period. Defendant contended that
since the contract was not to be performed within one year,
it was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, there
being no adequate written memorandum of the agreement.
The District Court found for the plaintiff. The minutes of
a meeting of the board of directors of a corporation, signed
by the secretary, constituted a memorandum sufficient to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has not yet
passed on this specific point, two principles have been
enunciated which are implicit in the result of the instant
case. Delivery of the memorandum is not necessary to take
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the contract out of the Statute of Frauds; Drury v. Young,
58 Md. 546 (1882). Nor is it relevant for what purpose the
memorandum was executed, so long as the formal requirements of the Statute of Frauds are satisfied; Crawford v.
Obrecht, 171 Md. 562, 570, 189 A. 809 (1937). At least two
courts in this country have reached the same result as the
principal case; Lamkin v. Baldwin & Lamkin Mfg. Co.,
72 Conn. 57, 43 A. 593, 596 (1899), and Louisville Trust
Co. v. NationalBank of Kentucky, 3 F. Supp. 909,917 (W. D.
Ky. 1932), [reversed on the ground that the Kentucky
statute of frauds peculiarly requires delivery of the memorandum] 67 F. 2d 97 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. den. 291 U. S.
665 (1934). See 37 C. J. S. 654, Statute of Frauds, Sec. 176,
for a list of the numerous types of documents in which
a sufficient memorandum can be contained (e.g., checks,
stock certificates, deeds, wills, pleadings, and depositions).
Criminal Law - Felony-Murder Doctrine. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A. 2d 472 (1958). Defendant was convicted of first degree murder for the death of
his co-felon, which occurred during a gunfight with the
police and was initiated by defendant while fleeing the scene
of an armed robbery. The fatal shot was unquestionably
fired by one of the policemen. The trial court's decision was
based on two prior Pennsylvania cases, Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A. 2d 204 (1955), and Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A. 2d 595, 12 A. L. R. 2d
183 (1949). Thomas sustained a murder conviction where
the defendant's co-felon was killed by the victim of the robbery; Almeida held the robber accountable for the accidental killing of an innocent bystander by the police or robber.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed (6-1). After
an extensive summary of the felony-murder doctrine and a
review of the cases in other jurisdictions, the Court concluded that the general, if not unanimous requisite for
felony-murder (except for the Thomas and Almeida cases,
supra) has been that the killing must be done by the defendant or an accomplice to the felony. Commonwealth v.
Thomas, supra, was therefore expressly overruled (482) as
an unwarranted judicial extension of the- felony-murder
doctrine. Under no rational theory can a person be criminally charged for the consequences of the lawful conduct
of another person. The Court did not overrule Commonwealth v. Almeida, supra, however, but distinguished it on
the basis that there the killing was only excusable (the
victim being a non-felon), whereas the killing in the in-
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stant case was justifiable (the victim being a felon). One
judge, concurring (500) sought express repudiation of
Almeida also. Justice Bell, dissenting (483) favored the
expansion of the doctrine for the further protection of
society and decried the majority for overruling law established in Pennsylvania by five decisions in the past ten
years.
Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, is noted in 16 Md. L.
Rev. 249 (1956). The article reviews the felony-murder
doctrine in Maryland and elsewhere. A recent case, People
v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508. 52 N. W. 2d 201 (1952) cited
with approval the Pennsylvania rule repudiated in the
principal case and sustained the first degree murder conviction of a robber for the death of a police officer who was
killed by a bullet from the gun of a fellow officer in a gun
battle with the robber. The cases are collected in 12 A. L. R.
2d 210.
Due Process - State Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporation. McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Company,
355 U. S. 220 (1957). Respondent, a Texas Corporation,
offered by mail to insure X, a California resident. X accepted and mailed the premiums from his California home
to respondent in Texas until his death. Upon respondent's
refusal to pay the beneficiary, plaintiff, suit was filed in
California pursuant to a California statute subjecting foreign corporations to suit in California on insurance contracts made with California residents. Service of process
was had by registered mail. Respondent had no offices or
agents in California; the only business ever solicited in
California was with X. Judgment was rendered in California for plaintiff, who then filed suit in a Texas court
on the judgment. The Texas courts considered the judgment void upon the theory that the service of process outside of California was a violation of Due Process. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The limits
placed on the jurisdiction of a state court over persons
served with process outside its. borders were in the past
measured by such criteria as "doing business," "consent,"
and "presence,' but these have largely been abandoned.
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316
(1945), required only that the defendant have "minimum
contacts" with the state. Recognizing that the trend is
toward increasing state jurisdiction in this area, the Court
in the instant case concluded that Due Process is not violated if the contract sued on had a "substantial connection"
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(222) with the state in which suit was brought. This requirement was met by (1) delivery of the contract in California, (2) payment of the premiums from that State, and
(3) residence of the insured in California.
2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, Sec. 92(d) subjects foreign
corporations (whether or not doing business in Maryland)
to suit in Maryland on contracts made within Maryland.
In view of the present decision, the constitutionality of this
statute seems certain. See 17 Md. L. Rev. 140 (1957) for a
discussion of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations
not "doing business" in the state. The noted case, Erlanger
Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F. 2d 502 (4th
Cir. 1956), denied North Carolina jurisdiction over a New
York corporation which shipped goods into North Carolina
pursuant to a contract entered into in New York. Quaere:
Whether this result is affected by the instant case?
Estate Tax - Marital Deduction - Quality Of Power
Of Appointment As Defined By Maryland Law. Estate of
Allen v. Commissioner, 29 T. C. No. 52 (Dec. 19, 1957).
Testator left the income from a trust to his wife for life,
corpus to those persons she shall appoint by her will.
Testator died a resident of Baltimore County, Maryland,
and the will was there probated. The executors computed
the estate tax by deducting the value of the aforementioned
trust from the gross estate. The assumption was that the
testamentary power of appointment in the wife was an
"interest" in property allowable as a marital deduction

under Sec. 812(e) (1) (F),

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF

1939

(now Sec. 2056(b) (5) of the 1954 CODE. This section
reduces the taxable estate of decedent to the extent of the
property over which the surviving spouse has a life interest
plus the power to appoint the corpus to herself or her
estate. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's disallowance. Whether the widow had the power to appoint
to herself or her estate is to be determined by local law.
At least two Maryland cases have held that a donee cannot
appoint to his estate or creditors unless the power has
been expressly conferred. Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 192 Md. 472, 479, 482, 64 A. 2d 704 (1949), and Connor
v. O'Hara,188 Md. 527, 530, 53 A. 2d 33 (1947). Due to the
evident absence of such express language, the widow's
interest does not qualify for the marital deduction.
This Maryland attitude toward "general" powers is also

relevant with respect to Sec. 2041 of the
CODE OF

INTERNAL REVENUE

1954, which includes in the gross estate of the
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donee the value of any property over which he has a power
of appointment if it is exercisable in favor of himself, his
estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate. The
Maryland rule prevails in only Kentucky and Rhode Island,
97 A. L. R. 1072 and Connor v. O'Hara,supra. At least one
writer has predicted its advance in the future, 99 A. L. R.
1156, but due to the tax considerations presented above,
this seems unlikely.
Negligence - Standard Of Care Imposed On Owner Of
Firearm. Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135 A. 2d 395 (Pa.
1957). Plaintiff and X, 12 year old grandchildren of defendant, were frequent guests at defendant's cottage, located in a somewhat isolated area. Defendant kept a loaded
gun in an unlocked drawer in his bedroom. Defendant
was aware that the youths knew the location of the loaded
gun. Although the youths were allowed to play in the
bedroom, they had been ordered not to touch any gun.
One afternoon, during defendant's absence, X took the gun
from the drawer and negligently discharged it, seriously
wounding plaintiff. Defendant's position was that he had
a right to keep a loaded pistol in his home to protect himself against nocturnal prowlers; to be required to keep the
drawer locked in the daytime but unlocked at night (so
that the pistol would be readily accessible) exceeded the
exercise of reasonable prudence under the circumstances.
Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed, (5-2), on appeal.
Although defendant was not an insurer, possession of a
loaded gun placed upon him the duty of exercising extraordinary care to prevent harm to others. Since it is common knowledge that children are attracted to firearms,
defendant could have reasonably anticipated "the likelihood of harm resulting from leaving the loaded pistol in
an unlocked drawer in a bedroom frequented by children."
X's negligence did not break the chain of causation between
defendant's negligence and the resulting injury. Under the
circumstances defendant was under a duty to keep the
drawer locked during the day. The dissent felt that the
majority decision would necessarily require a parent to
keep under lock and key every type of possibly dangerous
household article, such as kitchen knives.
For a discussion of the degree of care required under
varying factual circumstances, see 12 A. L. R. 812, 56 Am.
Jur. 1008, Weapons and Firearms, Sec. 25, and the cases
cited in note 15 of the instant decision.
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Taxation - Swimming Pool Club Is Social. United
States v. McIntyre, 26 L. W. 2493 (4th Cir., 1958). 26
I. R. C. (1954) Sec. 4241, imposes a 20% tax on dues paid
by members to any "social club". Plaintiff members sought
to recover said tax which they paid under protest, contending that their club was not "social" within the meaning
of the statute. The only activity of the club was to provide
and operate a community swimming pool and bath house
facilities for its members. The District Court for Maryland,
in exempting the members from the tax, concluded that
an organization is not "social" if its primary purpose is the
promotion of some common interest or objective, social
contacts are only incidental, and the social intercourse of
the members was only a casual incident of the primary
activity of the club, which was to provide recreational
facilities, a swimming pool (151 F. Supp. 388). The judgment was reversed on appeal. The record showed that the
club served the social purposes of its members, affording
them a place to meet and converse. The use, not the facility,
determines the result.
There appears to be no simple test for classifying organizations as social or non-social for purposes of Sec. 4241.
A club was social where the members, local businessmen,
met only at noontime to hold business conferences or converse about whatever they pleased while they lunched.
Duquesne Club v. Bell, 127 F. 2d 363, 143 A. L. R. 1377 (3rd
Cir., 1942). But Rockefeller Center Luncheon Club v.
Johnson, 131 F. Supp. 703 (S. D. N. Y., 1955), held that a
luncheon club for tenants of an office building development
was not social. The primary purpose was to provide adequate eating facilities, and the social intercourse was incidental. The cases are collected in 143 A. L. R. 1381.
Trusts - Cash Dividend Distributions To Life Beneficiary - Income Or Principal. Third National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Campbell, 145 N. E. 2d 703 (Mass. 1957). X's
will created a trust, income to W for life, then to X's daughters for life, with remainder over to persons not yet ascertainable. The trust held 300 shares of a corporation, which
paid out cash dividends, which in turn were distributed to
W. For federal income tax purposes, these dividends were
treated as a return of capital and, therefore, tax exempt
income. Subsequently, the trustee sold these shares at
substantial profit. In determining the capital gains tax
on the transaction, the trustee was required to reduce the
cost basis of the stock by the amount of the tax exempt
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income paid to the widow. Petitioner, representing the
remaindermen, contended that since the life tenant received the benefit of the tax exempt dividends, she should
likewise share the burden of the increased capital gains
tax to the extent that said dividends caused the reduction
of the cost basis of the stock. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts charged the entire tax to the principal.
The Massachusetts rule is that all cash dividends are treated
as income in the absence of facts showing that the dividends are a return of capital. The record does not show
that the distributions were from capital rather than earnings. The virtue of the rule is its simplicity, whereas allocation of the trust expenses between the life tenant and
remaindermen poses many difficulties: estimation of future
capital gains, offset of capital losses to gains, possible carry
over of capital losses, and death of one of a series of life
tenants before sale.
The Massachusetts rule of awarding cash dividends to
income (except disbursements "designated by the corporation as a return of capital") has been adopted in Section 5
of the Uniform Principal and Income Act, thereby rejecting
the so-called Pennsylvania rule of apportionment between
the two funds. 9B U. L. A. 365, 366 (1957), Commissioner's
Prefatory Note. The Act was adopted in Maryland 1939,
7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 75B, Secs. 1-10, and twenty other
states. 9B U. L. A. 365 (1957). Note also Section 7(2), requiring that all taxes on gains on certain types of principal
be paid out of principal, regardless of how defined by the
taxing authorities. Prior to the passage of the Act the
Pennsylvania rule of apportionment was the rule in Maryland. Lindau v. Community Fund of Baltimore, 188 Md.
474, 478, 53 A. 2d 409 (1947).
The instant Massachusetts case might be a good guide
in Maryland as to the application of Section 5 of the Act
which is patterned on the Massachusetts rule. But it should
be borne in mind that since the Act is in derogation of the
prior Maryland law of apportionment, it may be more
narrowly construed.
Unemployment Compensation - Recovery Barred By
Participating In Or Financing Labor Dispute. Soricelli v.
Bd. of Review, etc., 46 N. J. S. 299, 134 A. 2d 723 (1957).
Twelve unions represented the various employees at the
plant of claimant's employer. When the members of Union A
went out on strike, claimant, a member of Union B, voluntarily refused to cross the picket line and remained away
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from work for the duration of the strike. He also contributed
one dollar to Union A's strike fund. By contract between the
employer and Union B, no employee who was in Union B
was required to cross a duly established picket line. Over
90% of the employees in the plant continued to work during the strike; and there was no threat of violence to those
crossing the picket line. Work was available to claimant
throughout the strike. This suit was brought to recover
unemployment compensation under N. J. S. A. (1950)
43:21-5(d), which precludes recovery to individuals "participating in or financing ... [a] labor dispute". [Brackets
added.] The Employment Security Division held that
claimant was disqualified from benefits, and the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed. (1)
Voluntary refusal to cross a picket line constitutes "participation" in a labor dispute. (2) The employer - Union B
contract is of no avail to claimant. To hold otherwise would
allow one disqualified by statute to nevertheless recover
unemployment compensation. Public policy as pronounced
in legislation cannot be circumvented by private agreements. (3) Claimant's one dollar contribution to the strike
fund constitutes a "financing" of a labor dispute. The act of
contribution, not the amount, is the test for disqualification.
The Maryland Unemployment Compensation Law is
substantially identical to the statute construed in the instant
case. MD. CODE (1951) Art. 95A, §2 (purpose of the Act)
and §5(e). It is well settled in Maryland that voluntary
refusal to cross a picket line is participation in a labor dispute. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Emp. Sec. Bd., 209 Md. 237,
243, 121 A. 2d 198 (1956). Accord: 28 A. L. R. 2d 287, 333.
Note Brown v. Maryland Unemp. Comp. Board, 189 Md. 233,
55 A. 2d 696 (1947), which held that claimant's refusal to
cross a picket line was voluntary even though the union's
constitution expressly prohibited its members from crossing
picket lines. No Maryland case at the appellate level has yet
construed the scope of the term "financing . . . [a] labor
dispute".
Wills - Reservation Of Right To Amend Document
Incorporated By Reference. In Re Protheroe's Estate, 85
N. W. 2d 505 (S. D. 1957). Testator executed a formal will,
making disposition of his real and personal effects "in accordance with the attached list of assets (made current by
subsequent lists)." (507). [Emphasis supplied]. A legatee
sought to vacate the county court's decree admitting the
will to probate. Petitioner contended that the testator's
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reservation of the right to amend the list of assets rendered
the will void, even though no changes had in fact been
made. The county court's dismissal of the petition was
affirmed by both the circuit court and the Supreme Court
of South Dakota. By the doctrine of incorporation by reference, an extrinsic document takes effect as part of the
will if such document was in existence at the time of the
execution of the will and has been adequately described
therein. The mere reservation of the right to alter the
extrinsic writing is not fatal where this right has not been
exercised, because the essential requirement that the extrinsic writing be in existence at the time the will is executed has not yet been violated. The actual subsequent
exercise of the right is the controlling question.
The problem in the instant case is usually presented
where an amendable or revocable inter vivos trust has
been incorporated by reference into a will. There is a split
of authority in this country as to whether such incorporation is effective where the power of amendment has not
been exercised as of the testator's death. For contradistinctive analyses see Palmer, Testamentary Disposition to
the Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 33,
36-49 (1951), and Lauritzen, Can a Revocable Trust Be Incorporated by Reference?, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 583 (1950). The
doctrine of incorporation by reference is recognized in
Maryland. Hull's Estate, 164 Md. 39, 163 A. 819 (1933).
The cases are collected in 21 A. L. R. 2d 220.
Workmen's Compensation - Assault - Course Of Employment - "But For" Test. Howard v. Harwood's Restau-

rant Co., 25 N. J. 72, 135 A. 2d 161 (N. J. 1957). Claimant,
employed as assistant manager in appellant's restaurant,
was attacked and beaten by a co-employee on appellant's
premises. The attack was motivated by the assailant's
insane delusion that he was punishing his common law
wife for wrongs done him. Appellant contended that an
attack by an insane co-employee was not one arising out
of the employment. The trial court's award was sustained
by the appellate division and affirmed by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. An accident arises out of the course
of employment where, but for the employment, the accident would not have happened. This "but for" test is applicable only where (1) the injury is one which would
more likely than not have occurred during the time and
place of employment rather than elsewhere, and (2) the
nature of the risk bears a sufficient causative relation to
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the employment. This includes neutral risks, such as acts
of God, but precludes risks arising out of personal relationships between employees. An attack by an insane coemployee is a neutral risk of the employment and therefore
compensable.
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has not expressly adopted the "but for" test to determine causation
of an accident, note the language in Watson v. Grimm, 200
Md. 461, 466, 90 A. 2d 180 (1952). There the claimant, while
riding on the running board of employer's truck, became
dizzy, fell off and was fatally injured. The dizziness was
caused by an idiopathic condition not connected with the
employment. It was held that the injury arose out of the
employment for it was contributed to by some factor
peculiar to the employment and would not have occurred
"if it had not been for the employment" (466). A more
extreme case is Todd v. Easton FurnitureMfg. Co., 147 Md.
352, 128 A. 42 (1925). A night watchman, while making
his rounds, was killed. The attack was motivated by personal animosity toward him by the assailant. The death
was held compensable for the position of night watchman
exposed him to increased danger of injury.
The cases are collected in a series of A. L. R. annotations,
culminating with 112 A. L. R. 1258.

